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Abstract. Time consistent policies and reforms of intergenerational transfers are analyzed in an 
overlapping generation model.  Governments have preferences, which give much weight to the living 
generations and they cannot commit themselves to future taxes and transfers, which will be decided by 
future governments with different objectives. The economy follow one of two equilibrium paths with 
perfect foresight. On one path, governments finance the costs of their transfers to the living by 
increasing public debt recklessly. Consumers pay more and more taxes to finance the cost of this debt, 
and the successive generations will enter a process of immiserisation. On the other path, in spite of 
their preference bias, governments borrow less and put the economy on a path of egalitarian 
consumption flows for the successive generations, with a constant ratio of public debt to national 
income. The mechanisms, which put an economy on one or the other equilibrium paths, are 
unconnected to the fundamentals of the model.  
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1. Introduction 
In his excellent survey of retirement Cairncross (2004) writes: “A larger generation of old folk than 
ever before will need support for longer than ever before from a population of working age that is 
shrinking continuously in absolute size for the first time since the Black Death. Moreover, if things 
look bad in America and worse in continental Europe, they will one day look calamitous in some parts 
of the developing world”. There are two causes of this demographic transition: a widespread fall in  
fertility and an increase in life expectancy. This demographic transformation creates a financing 
problem for pay-as-you-go systems.  To maintain the level of pensions unchanged, contributions to 
pension funds must be repeatedly increased. Moreover, the gap between the market interest rate and 
the implicit rate of return of the system becomes wider, which causes a decline in the economic 
condition of the young. The most natural reform to reduce the burden on the young is to decrease the 
level of pensions, which will lower the increase in contributions and free some income of the young 
generation. This saving can be invested in the financial markets at better rates. This policy will 
increase the welfare of the young and unborn, but it will decrease the income of the pensioners and the 
expected income of the people who are planning to retire early.  
We can think of adding an ingredient to this reform. The loss of income of pensioners can be 
compensated by a transfer from the government, financed by public borrowing. This increase in public 
debt will be financed by the income of the young, freed by the decrease or the slower increase of their 
contribution. However, the consequence of this policy will be to increase the taxation of future 
generations. It will transfer a sacrifice from the elderly, currently alive, to people who are not yet born. 
This proposal is often canvassed in current political discussions. For instance, we can refer to a very 
good article in The Economist (“From slogan to legacy”, 13 November 2004), on the state of the 
debate inside the American administration and the Republican party or to the Economic Focus 
published by this magazine on 11 December 2004. Feldstein (2005) also gives a stimulating discussion 
of these issues. 
A quotation by Miles and Cerny (2001) help understand why a government could be forced to 
borrow as an element of its intergenerational transfer policy: “The result that a large proportion of 
those alive now would be worse off if the unfunded state scheme is phased out – even though every 
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future generation is better off – illustrates the nature of the transition problem rather clearly. 
Democratically elected governments facing voters who focus on the direct implications to them (and 
not to all future generations) of changes to state pension systems would find it hard to get support for 
this kind of transition plan. Table 2 suggests that once a transition from an unfunded to a funded 
scheme is complete welfare for all subsequent generations will be higher, but without relying on 
deficit financing the transition will cause certain generations to be worse off, and those generations 
could form a majority of voters permanently blocking any change.”  
We investigate these questions in an overlapping generation model with the hypothesis that 
successive governments organize any intergenerational transfer between living and still unborn people, 
under the only constraint that they always face their obligations to their creditors. A government gives 
more weight to the living than to the unborn. Moreover, if it can set transfers and taxes for the current 
period, it cannot commit itself to future taxes and transfers, which will be decided by the next 
governments with different objectives. However, a government can set the level of public debt, which 
will be transmitted to its successor.  A government can give generous transfers to the living and 
finance the cost of this policy by borrowing. Its successors can follow the same policy and this will 
initiate a process of increasing public debt, which will lead to the immiserisation of future generations. 
We suggested that this policy can result from the difficulties currently met by the public pension 
system and by the political resistance to reform it. More generally, it can result from the increasing 
cost of the Welfare state, which governments can allow themselves to be tempted to finance by public 
borrowing. Heller (2003) gives a fascinating account of the dangers for a society, which puts off costs 
that should be paid in the current time and which increases the burden of future generations.   
The results, which will be proven, partly confirm these concerns. We find that the economy 
can follow any of two equilibrium paths. In one of them, governments borrow more and more to 
improve the conditions of the living. Then, the increasing cost of public debt will lead taxes to always 
higher levels, and the successive generations will become poorer and poorer. However, there exists 
another equilibrium. Governments, which cannot commit to future decisions and are especially 
sensitive to the welfare of the living, will however put the economy on a path of egalitarian 
consumption flows of the successive generations. The explanation of this result is that if a government 
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borrowed too much, the following government would punish the generations, which were already alive 
under the first government, by increasing their taxes. The less the first government cared for these 
generations, the harsher this punishment will be. Thus, the expectation of this punishment will 
discipline the first government and discourage it of borrowing too much. We will also show that, for 
the last equilibrium, in times of demographic transition, the sacrifice, which will have to be made, will 
be shared in an egalitarian way across generations. 
A difference between the first and the second equilibrium is the extent of the punishment by a 
government of the generation, which was already alive under the previous government, the one which 
could borrow too much. This punishment is higher for the second than for the first equilibrium. 
However, in both situations, expectations are perfect. The mechanisms, which put an economy on one 
or the other equilibrium paths, are unconnected to the fundamentals of the model. We are left with the 
open question of which sunspots will decide if the future generations will enter or not an 
immiserisation process. The fact that these sunspots cannot be directly connected to demographic 
transition, does not prevent the possibility that we have entered a period when some Western 
economies have switched from a path of stable public debt to a path of increasing indebtedness. Public 
and foreign deficits and debts have followed worrisome trends in some industrialized countries, in the 
current decade. 
The analysis of intergenerational transfers is usually made by using an overlapping generation 
model (Azariadis, 1993; de la Croix and Michel, 2002). We assume that our economy is small and 
open on the rest of the world. This assumption, or more precisely the possibility of international 
borrowing and deficits of the balance of trade, is necessary to make the transfers from future to current 
generations possible. We will see that the problem is not so much the increase in the public debt as the 
share of this increase, which leads foreign debt up.  Successive governments and generations of 
consumers will participate in a dynamic game where governments will adopt Markov strategies, and 
where the private sector will adapt its decentralized decisions to the current and expected decisions of 
governments.  
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In Grossman and Helpman (1998), short-lived governments have an objective function similar 
to ours and the similar concept of perfect Markov equilibrium is used, but the economy is closed, 
governments must always balance their budgets and the production and utility functions are linear. The 
conclusions differ and, instead of two equilibria, there are an infinity of them.  
The model is presented in the first section. We will describe the dynamic game played 
between successive governments and generations of people in the second section. We will also explain 
how governments determine their public transfers and debts. Several lemmas characterizing the 
equilibrium paths of the model will be given in the third section. We will investigate the first 
equilibrium where the consumption and the welfare of successive generations remain constant over 
time in the fourth section. The second equilibrium where successive generations enter an immesirising 
process will be analyzed in the fifth section. A discussion of an alternative definition of equilibrium 
will be given in the sixth section. 
2. An Overlapping Generations Model  
The model is constructed for a small open economy. Domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitute 
and the international capital market is perfect. Time is assumed to be discrete, 0 denotes the current 
period, and agents hold perfect expectations. All economic variables are expressed in real terms.  
consumers were born at the beginning of period . They will die at the end of period t . They work 
for the first period of their life, then retire. Each worker receives wages . The total number of 
births increases over time at rate 1
)(tN
t 1
)(tw
0 n . We have , for , where 
 denotes the total number of people entering the second period of their life at the 
beginning of period 0. We norm the population by setting 
1) tn1()(  NtN
1
1t
)1( NN
N . The domestic interest rate is equal to 
the interest rate in the rest of the world, i , which is exogenous and constant over time. We need 
the following assumption: 
0* 
 
Assumption 1. The interest rate in the rest of the world is higher than the growth rate of population: 
.   ni *
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Domestic output in period t , Y , is proportional to the employment in the period. )(t
 tnPtPNtY  1)()(                  (1)  
To simplify the model, we assume that the productivity term P  stays constant over time. The natural 
growth rate of the economy is equal to the growth rate  of the active population. The wage rate is 
equal to: . 
n
Pwtw )(
1.1. The Public Sector 
)(1 ts  and  denote net public transfers made by the government, respectively to each young and 
to each old person, in period . To simplify the model we assume that the government does not 
consume goods. Public debt at the end of period t , deflated by the active population living in the 
period, is denoted as . The budgetary equilibrium of the government is  
)(2 ts
t
)(tB
)1(*)1()()()1()()1( 21  tBitstsntBn            (2) 
Eq. (2) determines the dynamics of total public debt  (the initial level of total public 
debt  is given). We assume that the sequence of net public transfers is consistent with a 
bounded public debt per worker . Under Assumption 1, this condition implies the inter-temporal 
solvency of the government: . 
)()1( 1 tBn t
0
)1(B
)(tB
1()  	*)1/()(



t
tintB
1.2. Plan of a Consumer Born at the Beginning of Period  0t
We assume that consumers receive no endowment at their birth and leave no bequest when they die. 
The non capital incomes of a consumer born at the beginning of period t , in the two periods of its life, 
respectively are: , and:  . The wealth at birth of this consumer is  )(1 tsw  )1(2 ts
*)1/()1()()( 21 itstswtW                (3) 
This agent consumes C and  in the two periods of his life. These consumption flows 
must satisfy the budgetary constraint    
)(1 t )1(2 tC
)(*)1/()1()( 21 tWitCtC                            (4) 
The wealth of this consumer at the end of period , which is identical to national private wealth per 
worker, is  
t
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)()()( 11 tCtswtA                (5) 
We assume that consumers take their lifetime decisions at the time of their birth. They perfectly 
forecast their future incomes. Their discount rate is 0  and their preference for consumption is 
logarithmic. The utility at birth of a consumer born at the beginning of period t  is  
 	  	 )1/())1(ln)(ln)( 21  tCtCtU             (6)   
Nothing substantial would change in the analysis if we assumed an incompressible level of 
consumption per period: 0C , or it the utility function belonged to the more general class of CRRA 
functions: C , with )1/(1   0 . 
The maximization of the utility function in Eq. (6) under the budgetary constraint (4) gives the 
consumption of this consumer in the two periods of his life 
     2/1)()(1 tWtC                (7) 
    2/*1)()1(2 itWtC               (8) 
1.3. Plan of a Consumer Born at the Beginning of Period 1  
This consumer enters the second part of his life at the beginning of period 0. His wealth inherited from 
the past is . Moreover, this consumer receives public transfers  . His consumption is 
equal to the sum of his wealth, the interest income earned on this wealth and his non-wealth income  
)1(A )0(2s
)0()1(*)1()0( 22 sAiC                (9) 
The utility of this consumer at the beginning of period 0 is  
 )0(ln)1( 2CU  	               (10) 
The total wealth at birth of each consumer is assumed positive:. 
 
Assumption 2. The government’s transfer policy must satisfy the constraints: 
, and:  , for t . 0)1(*)1()0(2  Ais 0*)1/()1()( 21  itstsw 0
 
Finally, if  with t  represents the net foreign assets owned by the economy, at the end of 
period t  and deflated by the active population, we have 
 tF 1
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     tBtAtF                (11) 
  
2. How Does the Government Determine Public Transfers and Debt? 
We can easily prove that the sum of the discounted wealth at birth of all generations, computed in 
period 0, is equal to the sum of the discounted consumption of these generations and is independent of 
intergenerational transfers:  
 	 	
)1()1()*/()1(
*)1/()0(*)1/()1(*)1/()1()( 2
1
0
21






BAniwn
iCinitCtC
t
t        (12) 
We assume that these sums are positive. 
 
Assumption 3. The initial conditions of the economy satisfy: (  	 0)1()1()*()1  BAniwn . 
 
Assumption 2 implies the validity of Assumption 3. Eq. (12) shows that a reform of the public transfer 
policy to the successive generations improve the welfare of some generations and lead to a decline in 
the utility of other generations. This efficiency result is well known (Azariadis, 1993; Feldstein and 
Liebman, 2002). Its consequence is that the system of intergenerational transfers, which prevails in an 
economy, results from government’s arbitrage between the various generations.  
We introduce an objective function of the government at time 0: 
)0()1()1()0( UnAU  ,            (13) 0A
This function gives different weights to the utilities )1(U  of the elderly alive in period 0, and  
 of the cohort of the youth who are also currently alive. The government does not care for 
generations, which will be born in later periods. Grossman and Helpman (1998) give political 
foundations for this function. More general objective functions could be considered. However, this 
specification is simple and will be sufficient to establish our results. 
)0()1( Un
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At time 0, the government sets only its decisions for this period and cannot commit itself to these 
decisions, which will be implemented by future governments. When this government makes its choice 
it must anticipate the reactions of the governments of the future, the objective functions of which are: 
, t . In this expression,  )()1()1()1()( tUnAtUnt t  	 1 )1( tU  and U   represent the 
utility of each old person and of each young person, alive in period t , computed for the whole rest of 
their life. The relative weights of the various cohorts in the government’s objective function change 
over time. Therefore, the solution to the problem exhibits dynamic inconsistency: the actions for the 
future periods that the government would choose in period 0, if it were able to pre-commit, would 
differ from those it finds optimal when in periods 1, 2, etc. The standard approach to analyze 
sequential decisions problems with time-inconsistent preferences is to view the decision-maker in each 
period  as a distinct player, in the sense of non-cooperative game theory (Vieille and Weibull, 2005). 
One obtains a sequential game with infinitely many players, each one acting only once, but caring not 
only about the material payoff in his own period but also about the payoffs in subsequent periods.  
)(t
t
The Markov perfect equilibrium is a concept of solution, which is well adapted to our 
problem. According to Maskin and Tirole (2001), “consider a dynamic game in which, in every period 
, player ’s payoff  depends only on the vector of players’ actions, , that period, and on the 
current (payoff-relevant) `state of the system’ 
t i it ta
tt  . That is, . Suppose, 
furthermore, that player ’s possible actions  depend only on 
),( tt
i
t ag 
i
t
i itA t :  and that )( t
i
tA 
i
tA  t  is 
determined by the previous actions  and state 1ta 1t . Finally, assume that each player maximizes a 
discounted sum of per period payoffs:   it1t t . In period , the history of the game, , is the 
sequence of previous actions and states 
t th
    ttath a  ,,..., 1,1 2 . But the only aspect of history that 
directly affects player ’s payoffs and action sets starting in period  is the state i t t . Hence, a Markov 
strategy in this model should make player i ’s period t  action dependent only on the state t  rather 
than on the whole history … We shall define a Markov Perfect Equilibrium to be a subgame perfect 
equilibrium in which all players use Markov strategies”. These authors add: “Many economic models 
th
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entail games that are stationary in the sense that “they look the same” starting in any period”, i.e., they 
do not depend on calendar time. For these games it is natural to make Markov strategies independent 
of calendar time as well”. 
In our dynamic game, the initial state in period t  is defined by the amounts of public debt 
 and of national private wealth 
0
)1( tB )1( tA
(2
, deflated by the number of living old people. The 
government of this period sets the transfers to the living youth and elderly,  and . Then, 
these people determine their consumption. The behavior of the elderly is passive: each of them 
consumes his total wealth and income: C . Each young person 
determines his consumption of the period and his expected consumption of next period, C  and 
, according to Eq. (7) and (8). He needs to forecast the transfer he will receive from the 
government of period 
)(1 ts
)
)(2 ts
(1
()1() 2 tstAt  *)1( i
)t
)1(2 tC
1t , . Although he knows that this transfer depends on the aggregated 
choices of all the young consumers, he is also aware that his actions have no significant effect on these 
aggregated choices, and considers his expectation of 
)1(2 ts
)1(2 ts  as a value and not as a function. 
The government of period t  perfectly forecasts the reaction to its actions by the consumers of 
the same period. Moreover, it knows that the transfers decided by the next government are a function 
of the state of the economy at the beginning of period 1t : ))(),(()1(2 tAtBfts  . The 
government of period  makes the decision maximizing its objective function under the constraints 
given in Assumption 2. 
t
The definition of Markov strategies does not put any constraint on the shape of the reaction 
function . This function is affine is taken affine, an assumption discussed in Lemma 4: f
 , for t            (14) )()()1( 21
'
22 tAatBasts  0
From Eq. (3), (5) and (7) 
)1(
*1
1)()()2( 21 

 ts
i
tswtA 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Under the condition: 





1
2*)1(2 ia
t
, the reaction of the government of period t  expected by 
the government of period  is 
1
)()()1( 122 tstBsts   , with: *)1/()1(2
)2(
2
2
'
2
2 ia
was




s , 
*)1/()1(2 2
2
ia
a



 , 
*)1/()1(2
)2(
2
1
ia
a





        (16) 
In the rest of the text we use again the constant parameters , 2s   and  , instead of the original 
parameters , a  and . '2s 1 2a
 
3. Characterization of Equilibria  
The current period is t . We compute the decisions executed in this period by the current 
government and the decisions, which are expected to be executed in future periods by future 
governments. We will see that these decisions are consistent with the assumed reaction function. The 
government of period t  only cares for the living youth and elderly and its transfers can only increase 
the satisfaction of these agents. This government can increase these transfers by borrowing more. 
However, the governments of period 
0
1t  will react by punishing the living youth of period t , and 
this punishment will limit the profligacy of the government of this period.  
From Eq. (3) and (16), we deduce that the wealth at birth of somebody young in period  is t
         *11*1111*1
2
1
2
in
tsts
i
tB
ni
swtW













         (17) 
If the government of period  increases its transfers to each old person of this period by 1, then the 
government of period 
t
1t  will reduce  tW  by   *11/ in  . If the first government increases 
the transfers to each young people by 1, then its successor will reduce  tW  by    *1/ i   . 
Then, the total effect on W  will be  t    *1/ i1   . So,   and    measure the extent of 
the punishment of the profligacy of a government by its successor. 
 
 12  
In the second case, if the punishment is low that is if *1 i  , then the government of period  
will borrow as much as it can and set the transfers to its youth at the maximum level. If the punishment 
is severe:  
t
*1 i  , the government of period  taxes its youth at a very high level so that its 
successor more than compensates this rigor by giving generous benefits to this cohort in the next 
period. The successor finances the cost of this policy by borrowing. In both cases, the rise in 
t
 tW  is 
only constrained by the borrowing capacity of governments, which is reached when the whole income 
of the following generations is used to stabilize the public and foreign debts. Assumption 4 will 
exclude these corner solutions of the model by constraining the reaction function of the governments.  
 
Assumption 4. The reaction function of governments must satisfy the constraint: *1 i  . 
 
Lemma 1. The policy, which is implemented by the government of period t   is such that 0
)(
1
1*1
2
)(
1
2 tW
A
itC 



                                      (18) 
Proof. In Appendix. 
 
Lemma 2. The sequence of transfer policies is determined by the reaction function 
)()*1()()1( 122 tsitBsts              (19) 
by Eq. (2), (15) and (20):  
  	   	 )1/()()1/()1(*1)()(*1)1()1( 2222   AtCAtAitstAitstC   (20) 
for t , with and  given.  0 )1(A )1(B
Proof. Eq. (20) results from Eqs (8) and (18). 
 
Lemma 3 establishes a condition, which must be satisfied by the reaction function of governments: 
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Lemma 3. The existence of an equilibrium requires that either:   1A , or: 
)1/(1)1/(
1
1
*1
nAn
i




 .  
Proof. In Appendix. 
 
We have assumed that the reaction function of governments is affine. Lemma 4 shows that this 
assumption is weak. 
 
Lemma 4. The reaction function of the government of period 1t :  	)(),()1( 12 tstBfts   cannot 
simultaneously  satisfy the two following conditions  
a) The function f  is continuously differentiable. 
b) The function 
 	  	 ! !*)1/()(),1/()1(*)1()()()(arg)1(*)1()( 1211)(2 1 itsntBitstsftsMaxtBitsg ts 
 is point-to-point and continuously differentiable.  
Proof. In Appendix. 
 
This lemma excludes many reaction functions, but not the affine one. However, it is insufficient to 
prove that the reaction function must be affine. There is still the possibility that there exist other 
reaction functions, which would for instance be discontinuous. Even if we limit our analysis to the 
affine case, Lemma 3 suggests that the model has two equilibrium paths that we investigate now. 
 
4. An Egalitarian Equilibrium. Case A/)1(    
Proposition 1 gives all the features of this equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 1. The first equilibrium path of the economy is described by:  
a) The transfers to the elderly in period 0 are given by  
 	 ! )1(*)1()1()1()2(
)*()2)(1(
)1*)(1()0(2 

 BiBAw
nin
nis 

     (21) 
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b) The constant part of the transfers to the elderly in the following periods is given by 
 	 !)1()1()2(
)*()2)(1(
*)1)(*(
2 

 BAw
nin
inis 


       (22)   
c) The consumption flows of each old and young persons are constant over time and given by  
 	 !)1()1()*()1(
)*()2)(1(
*1)(2 

 BAniwn
nin
itC

,      (23)   
 	 !)1()1()*()1(
)*()2)(1(
1)(1 

 BAniwn
nin
tC


      (24) 
d) The transfers to the youth in period , , can be set to arbitrary levels. Public 
indebtedness per worker, is given by 
0t )(1 ts
 	 !)1()1()2(
)*()2)(1(
*1)()( 1 

 BAw
nin
itstB 

, for       (25) 0t
e) Assumption 3 implies the validity of Assumption 2. 
f) Net foreign assets per worker are constant over time and given by 
  )1()1()()(  BAtBtAtF , for          (26) 0t
g) The transfers to the elderly after period 0 are given by  
 	 !)1()1()2(
)*()2)(1(
*)1)(*()(*)1()1( 12 

 BAw
nin
initsits 

, t   (27) 0
Proof. In Appendix. 
To understand the economic meaning of Proposition 1, we introduce the concept of admissible 
paths of the consumption flows of the successive generations. First, such paths must satisfy the inter-
temporal budget constraint (12). Moreover, they must be consistent with the ratio set by each 
consumer between its consumption in the two parts of its life, given by Eq. (7) and (8) 
)1/(*)1()(/)1( 12  itCtC , for            (28) 0t
If we substitute this expression in Eq. (12), the admissible paths of the consumption of the elderly are 
given by 
 	 )1()1()*/()1(*)1/()0(*)1/()1()1(
*1
2
2
1
0
2 
 


 BAniwniCintCi
t
t

 (29) 
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The steady state solution of Eq. (29),  for t , is identical to Eq. (23). 22 )( CtC  0
The utility of the old generation living in period 0 is given by Eq. (10): U . 
The utility of the generation born in period  can easily be deduced from Eq. (6) 
 	)0(ln)1( 2C
0t
 )1(ln
1
2)1()()1( 2
11 


  tCntUn tt

	            (30) 
If for a moment the government of period 0 could commit itself to implement all its decisions, and if it 
cares for all generations and uses the social welfare function 
 	




0
1 )()1()1(
t
t tUnEDU , with  and 0D )1/(10 nE          (31)   
then this government would select the optimal admissible path of the consumption of the elderly by 
maximizing expression (31) under constraint (29). The first order conditions of this program is 
 	 	 )0(*)1()1/()1( 212 CEiDtC t             (32) 
We will get the same result as Eq. (23) if and only if  
 1D , and:               (33) *)1/(1 iE 
The social welfare function of the government becomes 









0
1
*)1(
)()1(
*1
1)1(
t
t
t
i
tUn
i
U . The 
optimal policy is implemented by the same system of transfers as in Proposition 1. We sum up the 
above considerations: 
Proposition 2. The first equilibrium path of the model is the only admissible steady state path 
consistent with the initial conditions. It  would be selected by a government who could commit itself to 
the execution of its decisions in the future if its social welfare function satisfied the constraints (33). 
 
We have assumed that a government cannot commit itself to its decisions, which will be 
implemented by future governments, and that it only cares for the living generations. However, in spite 
of this selfishness, the decisions taken by the successive governments result in a consumption flow per 
head, which does not change over time. This egalitarian allocation of consumption between 
generations implies that the government of a period does not transfer the cost of its generosity with the 
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living to the unborn, and does not deteriorate the fate of the later generation. The first equilibrium path 
of the model is independent of the weight  which the government gives to the youth in comparison 
to the elderly.  
A
The first solution of the model has the property of hysteresis: the net foreign assets per worker 
in each period and the consumption of each person are constant over time and permanently depend on 
the initial values of the net foreign assets (Laffargue, 2004). The transfers to the youth  are 
undetermined. This indetermination is transmitted to the transfers to the elderly s  and to public 
and private debts,  and . However, the value at birth of the transfers to an individual over its 
life cycle, s , is uniquely determined and constant over time. It is set in a way 
that keeps constant the amount of foreign assets per worker: 
)(1 ts
 t2
)(tB
(2 ts 
)(tA
 *1 i  /)11 t 
     tBtAtF  .  
The government of period t  sets  and the welfare of the old generation in period t  to the 
level it wants because no future government can correct this decision. However, the government of 
period  can punish the government of period  by increasing its taxes on the generation, which 
was young in period . The parameter 
)(2 ts
1t t
t   measures the extent of this punishment, which is inversely 
proportional to the weight of the youth,  in the objective function of the government of period . 
The more this government cares for this generation, the milder the punishment necessary to forbid this 
government of borrowing too much. 
A t
AT last, we investigate how the first equilibrium reacts to the demographic transition. This 
will be defined as a decrease in the population growth rate . We assume that  is constant and 
relatively large until period T , then it is set to a lower value at and after period 
n n
01  T . Eq. (26) 
shows that the net national wealth per worker, )()( tBtA  , does not change at and after T . From Eq. 
(23) and (24), at and after T , the consumptions per head C  and C  decrease (increase) by the 
same proportion if  
)t(1 )(2 t
 ()( 	)11()2  A Bw   is positive (negative), that is if the value at birth of 
the transfers received over the lifetime is positive (negative).  
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5. An Equilibrium immesirising Future Generations. Case: 
)1/(1)1/(
1
1
*1
nAn
i




  
Lemma 2 showed that the expansion rate of consumption per head is equal to )1/(  A . 
Assumption 5 below implies that this rate is less than 1, that: Ani /)1(*   . The successive 
generations will consume less and less. 
 
Assumption 5. The weight given to the young in the objective function of governments satisfies the 
constraint: )*/()1( niA   . 
 
In section 4, we suggested that *)1/()1(~ iDEA   . If: the discount rate of consumers is close 
to the international interest rate, *~ i , we have: 1~A
1
. This implies that the constraint of 
Assumption 5 is approximately equivalent to n , which is a constraint that we set at the beginning 
of section 1. Under this assumption, parameter  , which measures the severity with which a 
government reduces its transfers in reaction to the profligacy of its predecessor, is lower for the second 
equilibrium than for the first. The first equilibrium is based on the perfect foresight  that the next 
government will adopt a rigorous budgetary rule. This expectation disciplines the present government, 
which adopts the same rule. The net foreign assets per worker remains unchanged over time and there 
is no transfer of the cost of the current government policy to the following generations. In the second 
equilibrium, the current government anticipates that its successor will follow a laxer budgetary rule. It 
lacks incentive to follow itself a rigorous fiscal policy and leaves the net foreign assets of the economy 
to decrease. Successive generations will become poorer and poorer.  
 
Proposition 3. The second equilibrium path of the economy is described by: 
a) The constant part of the transfers to the elderly in periods after 0  is: 
 	 *)1(1)*/(2 iniws            (34)   
b) The transfers to the elderly in period 0 are: 
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      !)1/()1(1/)1()2()*/()1/(1/2
*1
)0(2
nBAAniw
nA
i
s






(35) 
c) The consumption flows of each old and young person  in period  are:  0t
     	 !
t
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tC 









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




1
)1()1()*()1(
1/2)1(
*1
*
)(2 (36)    
         	 !
1
1 1
)1()1()*()1(
1/2)1(
1
*
)(













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ABAniwn
Anni
t



C (37) 
d) The transfers to the youth in period , , can be set to arbitrary levels. Public 
indebtedness per worker is:                                                                                                          
0t )(1 ts
 /)1()2()*/(*)1()()( 21  tCniiwtstB , for      (38) 0t
e) Assumption 3 implies the validity of Assumption 2. 
f) Net foreign assets per worker are: 
         	 *)1/()1(1/211*/1)( 2 itCnAninwtF   , for  (39) 0t
g) The transfers to the elderly after period 0 are given by  
)1()2(*)1()(*)1()1( 212  tCiwtsits  , for    (40) 0t
Proof. In Appendix. 
 
This second equilibrium path of the economy is still admissible and efficient. We can easily 
show that the consumption in period 0 of each old person is higher than for the first equilibrium. 
However, the consumption of a person in each stage of his life decreases from generation to generation 
and converges to zero. We get again the same indetermination of the transfers to the youth as for the 
first equilibrium. This indetermination is transmitted again to the transfers to the elderly and to public 
and private debts. The value at birth of the transfers to an individual over his life cycle,  
       12*1/1)( 221  tCwitsts  , is uniquely determined, it decreases over time and 
converges to . Net foreign assets per worker, w )()( tBtA  , decrease over time and converge to the 
negative amount )*/()1( ninw  . In the long run, each person pays the total amount of his wealth 
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at birth to the government in order to finance the stabilization of the foreign debt, which results from 
the profligacy of previous governments. 
 
6. An Alternative Definition of the Equilibrium 
Each government has two control variables, which are independent of one another, the transfers to its 
youth and the transfers to its elderly. To prevent corner solutions we constrained the reaction function 
of governments by Assumption 4. Under this condition we proved the existence of two equilibria. For 
each of them the paths of consumption of the young and the old and of the net foreign assets of the 
economy are uniquely determined. However, there exists a large indetermination of the paths followed 
by public transfers and debt. As in a Ricardian world, increasing the transfers to the youth and 
financing the cost of this policy by issuing public bonds, which are subscribed by the young who need 
this saving to face the reduction in the transfers to be received in the next period, has no economic 
consequence (Eq. (25) and (27)). However, we dislike this indetermination, and look for an alternative 
to Assumption 4. Instead of constraining the reaction function of governments, we constrain their 
decisions, for example, by forbidding a government to increase (decrease) the transfer to the elderly 
without increasing (decreasing) the transfers to the youth, by the same amount: 
 
Assumption 6. The transfers to the two generations in a same period must satisfy:  
      " tsnts 12 1/ , with 0" , . 0t
 
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 6, the economy takes one of two equilibrium paths, each including 
an infinity of paths indexed by the parameter   of the governments’ reaction function. 
a) In the first path, consumption and transfers are constant over time, but their levels depend on 
parameter  . 
b) In the second path, consumption and transfers grow at the expansion rate 
 
   
2/1
1//11
*1
1
1








 nA
i
n 

. Their initial values depend on parameter  . 
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Proof. In Appendix. 
 
What its new is that, for each of the two equilibria, the difference in punishment of the 
profligacy in favor of the young relatively to the old,  , can be set at an arbitrary value. Expressions 
given in the proof determine the extent   of the punishment of the profligacy on the old. We have an 
infinity of each of the two kinds of equilibria, indexed by the parameter   of the reaction function of 
governments. However, for each value of this parameter and for each kind of equilibrium, we obtain a 
unique path of the transfers and public debt: the indetermination with the previous definition of 
equilibrium has disappeared.  
 For the second kind of equilibria, the expansion rate of the consumption of the elderly can be 
less or greater than 1. It increases with the values of parameters    and . Beside immesirisation, we 
also have the opposite case where the accumulation of public and foreign assets and transfers to the 
future generations improves over time their welfare.  
A
The new definition of equilibrium rests on an ad hoc constraint on the choices of a 
government. Other constraints would give different results. Moreover, the indeterminacy in the 
equilibriums obtained in sections 4 and 5 is rather innocuous and meaningful. Now, we get a much 
larger set of very different equilibria.  
 
Conclusion 
We have used an overlapping generations model of an open economy to analyze the setting of time 
consistent intergenerational transfers policies. Governments make their decisions without putting 
weight on the welfare of future generations. They cannot commit to decisions, which will be executed 
by their successors. However, they can constrain the choices of the governments of the future by 
setting the level of public debt (governments always face their obligations to their creditors). A 
government can punish a predecessor, which borrowed too much, by increasing taxes on people who 
were already alive under this previous government (which cared for the welfare of these consumers). 
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The model has two perfect foresight equilibrium paths. In the first one where the expected rate 
of punishment is high, governments follow rigorous policies and consumption and foreign debt per 
head remain constant over time. Future generations will not be sacrificed for the benefit of the current 
ones. The demographic transition does not change this result. It only makes all the consumers 
uniformly poorer. In the second equilibrium where the expected rate of punishment is lower, 
governments adopt laxer policies. The initial consumption of the elderly is higher than for the first 
equilibrium. However, consumption decreases over time and converges to zero. The foreign debt per 
head increases over time and converges to a high level. 
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APPENDIX. Proofs 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The program, which determines the choices of the government of time t  is 0
 )()1()1(
)(),( 21
tUnAtU
tsts
Max
 	
	
                                        (41) 
 )()1(*)1(ln)1( 2 tstAitU                                         (42) 
 	*)1/()1()(ln
1
2)( 21 itstswtU 




                        (43) 
)()()1( 122 tstBsts                                                    (44) 
 	 )1()1/(*)1()1/()()()( 21  tBnintststB           (45) 
with , , , )1( tA )1( tB 2s   given and   *1 i .  
 
This program is equivalent to the program  
 ))()1()1(
)(),( 21
tUnAtU
tsts
Max
 	
	
                                     (46) 
 )()1(*)1(ln)1( 2 tstAitU                                       (47) 
 	)1/()1(*)1/()1/()(*)1/(ln
1
2)( 22 ntBintsiswtU 

 


     (48) 
with , , , )1( tA )1( tB 2s   given.  
 
The value taken by the objective function of this program is independent of the transfers  to the 
youth. Its maximization relatively to the transfers to the elderly  gives Eq. (18). The second 
order condition is satisfied.   
)(1 ts
)(2 ts
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
Eqs (15) and (2) can be written 
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 )()(*)1()1()2( 122 tBtssiwtC  
 
	 (49) 
 	  	 0) 2  s1()1()*1()()(1 11  tBtsitBtsn  , for                                       (50) 1t
 
We use the first of these equations to eliminate )()(1 tBts   and )1()1(1  tBts  from the second 
equation. We get, for t  1
 
 	   *)1(*
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                                                                                                                                                            (51) 
As i ,  can be constant over time only if: n* 2s   1A  or if: )1/(1)1/(
1
1
*1
nAn
i




 .  
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
We will assume in the proof that: , which will simplify the notations. The objective function of 
the government of period  is 
0n
t
 	  *)1/()1()(ln
1
2)()1(*)1(ln 212 itstswAtstAi 



	                                           (52) 
This government considers  as given and forecasts the reaction function of the government of 
period : 
)1( tA
 (),( 1stB1t 	))1(2 tfts  . We assume that this function is continuously differentiable. 
We recall that 
)1(*)1()()()( 21  tBitststB                                                                                                (53) 
 
We assume that the function  	 *)1/()(),1(*)1()()()( 1211 itstBitstsfts 
 	)1(*)1()(2
 has a unique 
maximum in : )(1 ts )(1  tBits gts , with function g  continuously differentiable. 
We substitute this expression of  in the above function to obtain  )(1 ts
 	  	)1(*)1()(*)1/()(),1(*)1()()()( 21211  tBitshitstBitstsfts                   (54) 
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The function  is continuously differentiable.  h
We maximize the objective function of the government relatively to s  and obtain the 
necessary first-order condition 
)(2 t
 	
 	 0)1(*)1()(
)1(*)1()('
1
2
)()1(*)1(
1
2
2
2






 tBitshw
tBitshA
tstAi 

                                             (54) 
We deduce from Eq. (15) 
 	 )(
2
1)1(
2
*1)1(*)1( 21 tstsw
itAi


 




                                                                        (55) 
The first-order condition becomes 
 	
 	
 	 0)1(*)1()(
)1(*)1()('
1)()1(*)1(
1
2
2
21





 tBitshw
tBitshA
tstswi 
                                      (56) 
For  we have  1t
 	  	
 	  	)1()1()1()1(
)2(*)1()1()2(*)1()1()(
11
222


tstBgtstBh
tBitsgtBitshts
                                           (57) 
Let us set: )1()1( 1  tstBx , and )1(1  tsy . We have the functional equation 
 
 	
 	)*)(1()()(
)*)(1()()('
1)()(*)1(
1
yxixgxhhw
yxixgxhhA
xgxhywi 



 
                              (58) 
or 
 	
 	
 	  !yxixgxhyxixgxhh
yxixgxhhw
A
yxixgxhFxwi



 

*)1()()(
)*)(1()()('
)*)(1()()(1
)*)(1()()()*)(1(
                             (59) 
As the right-hand side must be independent of , the function  must be constant. However, in this 
case it cannot depend linearly on 
y F
x .  
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
a) The last equation of the proof of Lemma 3 gives  
 	 !*)1()0()1(*)1()2()*()*( 22 iwsAinisni                                             (60) 
If we notice that: C )1()0( 22 C , Eq. (15) written for 0t  gives 
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 	  	)0()0(//*)1(/)1(*)1()0()2( 122 sBsiwAis                                    (61) 
Eq. (2) written for t  gives 0
)1/()1(*)1()1/()0()0()0( 21 nBinssB                                                                     (62) 
We eliminate  between the two last equations. We get )0()0( 1sB 
 	 )1/()1(*)1(*)1()1(*)1)(2()0()1/(2 22 nBiiwAisns        (63) 
We eliminate  between Eq. (63) and the Eq. (60). We get Eq. (21). 2s
b) If we substitute the expression of  given by Eq. (21) in the last expression of , we get 
Eq. (22). 
)0(2s 2s
c) If we substitute the expression of  given by Eq. (21) in Eq. (9), we get Eq. (23). We use 
Eqs (7) and (8) to get Eq. (24).  
)0(2s
d) Eq. (15) written for  gives 0t
 //*)1(/)2()()( 221 siwCtstB                                                                     (64) 
If we substitute Eq. (64), the expressions of  and C  given by Eq. (22) and (23), we get Eq. (25). 2s 2
e) Assumption 2 is equivalent to , which is equivalent to Assumption 3. 0)(2 tC
f) We subtract B  from the expression of  given by Eq. (15) )(t )(tA
 	  	 	)()()1()2*)(1()1(*)1()()(*)1)(2( 12 tBtsisiwtBtAi     (65) 
We substitute the expressions of  and  given by Eq. (22) and (25). We get Eq. (26). 2s )(tB
g) Eq. (27) is deduced from Eq. (19), (22) and (25). 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
a) The last equation of the proof of Lemma 3 gives Eq. (34). 
b) If we notice that:   )1(1/)0( 22 CAC   , Eq. (15) written for t  gives 0
 	    	)0()0(*)*)1()0()2( 122 sBsis 1(1/)1( iwAA                   (66) 
Eq. (2) written for  gives 0t
)1/()1(*)1()1/()0()0()0( 21 nBinssB                                                          (67) 
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We eliminate  between Eq. (66) and Eq. (67). We get )0()0( 1sB 
    	  
)1/()1(*)1(*)1(
1/)1(*)1)(2()0()1/(1/2 22
nBiiw
AAisnAs

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
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          (68) 
We eliminate  between Eq. (68) and Eq. (34) and get Eq. (35). 2s
c) If we use Eqs (9) and (35) we get   
     	 !)1/()1()1()*/()1/(1/2
*)1()0(2 nBAniwnA
iC 





                   (69) 
We deduce Eq. (40) and (41) and Eq. (7) and (8). 
d) Eq. (9) and (15) written for t  give 0
 	 )1()2(*)1()()( 221  tCiwststB                                                                    (70) 
If we use the expressions of  given by Eq. (34), we get Eq. (38). 2s
e) Assumption 2 is equivalent to , which is equivalent to Assumption 3. 0)(2 tC
f) We deduce Eq. (39) from Eq. (9), (11) and (38). 
g) We deduce Eq. (40) from Eq. (19), (34) and (38). 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
The wealth at birth of a person young in period  is  t
      	    *)11*1211*11*1
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Eq. (20) of Lemma 2 is substituted by 
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

	                                                                                        (72) 
We get a dynamic system with 4 variables,  ts1 ,  ts2 ,  tB  and  tC2 , and Eq. (16), (2), the 
relationship of Assumption 6 and  
           1*1*112 212  tstsiiwtC , with t , 0  1B  given 
This system leaves the initial value  undetermined, but when this value is set, we compute the 
initial values of the two last variables 
 02s
 01s  and  02C  with Eq. (9) and the relationship of 
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Assumption 6. We will deduce the value of  02s  and of parameters   and , from the fact that 
 must grow at the geometric rate. We obtain the dynamic system of two equations with two 
variables,  and . 
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In this system, the steady state value of 2sˆ s2  is given by  
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The eigenvalues of the dynamic system are the solutions 1)   and 2)  of the characteristic equation 
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To be brief, we consider the cases when    	11/2  nn   and  . The system has a 
unique steady state and two different and real eigenvalues, which differ from 1.  
  is known. If we set , we can easily compute  02s  0B , then 2s . 
The dynamic path of the transfers to the elderly is  
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Finally, the expression of the path followed by the consumption of the elderly is 
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We know that this consumption grows at the expansion rate  	*2
1
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. We have two 
different kinds of equilibrium paths for the model. 
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a) The consumption remains constant over time 
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We are in the case of an egalitarian equilibrium. The two last conditions, which are equivalent to 
 determine  and .     222 ˆ10 sss   02s 2s
b) The consumption grows at the rate of the eigenvalues of the dynamic system. This growth rate 
satisfies the characteristic equation  
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As, consumption cannot be negative, we have  
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The two last conditions determine  and .  02s 2s
 
